The 2008 global financial and economic crisis has disturbed the evolution of research and innovation (R&I) policies in Europe, and it continues to have significant consequences. This paper reviews the evolution of and changes in R&I policy funding and measures before and in the aftermath of the crisis, and analyses reactions in three, Southern, CentralEastern, and North-Western European country groups. Based on analysis of the ErawatchTrendChart Inventory, we show that the crisis-induced three different responses. In NorthWestern Europe, it induced further support for R&I activities; in Southern Europe, it led to the collapse of national public support and its substitution only to some extent by EU Structural Funds, and in Central-Eastern Europe to an apparently much stronger compensation effect. Overall, these trends suggest that R&I policies have operated as a factor of further divergence between North-West and South, and as a potential factor of convergence between North-West and Central-East.
Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing economic and public sovereign debt crisis disturbed the evolution in Europe of both business research and innovation (R&I) and public R&I policies. The crisis had a severe impact on the real economy, resulting in a decreased supply of credit, increased credit standards and cutbacks in firm investments (European Commission, 2014) . Finance for innovation started to dry up as a result of more risk-averse behaviour, and this has had an impact on innovation activities. It triggered a shift in many business strategies from long-term competitiveness to short-term survival (OECD, 2009) . As a consequence, some of the structural problems in the economy have become more apparent. The crisis has more heavily impacted some countries than others.
Southern European countries, such as Greece, Spain or Portugal have had to be bailed out.
In Central Europe, in countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, the crisis has had a severe impact on the economy (Hebakova et al., 2011) , while the economy in Poland has been more resistant (Reichardt, 2011) . The crisis led to the protracted decline of GDP in South EU, to a sharp drop in previously high rates of the CEE and stagnant growth in developed EU countries. For example, in 2008 For example, in -2015 period real GDP in the South fell on average by 1.4% while in CEE and developed EU led to stagnant average growth rates of 0.8% and 0.6% respectively 1 .
Seven years since the start of the financial and economic turmoil in Europe, finding the optimal response to the crisis is still pertinent, but this extended period allows reflection on how R&I policies have changed or retained their orientation in the wake of the crisis and how it unfolded in different parts of Europe. the lack of data and the complexity involved in separating general trends from shifts that are a direct result of the crisis, there is no consensus on the effects of the crisis on RDI.
The previous literature shows that there is a pro-cyclical relationship between the general economic performance indicators and the variables related to a country's RDI performance. According to the OECD's (2009) analysis of the effects of the economic crisis on innovation activities, in times of crisis, innovative firms tend to scale back their R&D expenditure and investment in risky projects. This shift in behaviour is frequently accompanied by a reduction in patenting activities, new trademark applications, and a drop in venture capital financing. At the microeconomic level, the above observations are supported by Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data (Archibugi et al., 2013) , which shows that most companies reduced their R&D efforts in the aftermath of the crisis, with only a small proportion maintaining these activities at the same level.
Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) also show that a large number of firms managed to maintain their investments in innovation while the trends in R&D investment are divergent.
The number of enterprises that have been able to continue expanding their R&D has dropped dramatically, and the number that has scaled down their R&D has increased substantially. R&D is an expensive fixed cost activity, and it seems that the crisis has led to the polarization of R&D performing firms -reducing the number of large R&D players and the number of R&D active firms. The geographic spread of these effects shows that the most affected countries are the European 'catching-up countries', especially new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Also, Veugelers (2014: 2) argues that there be an increasing R&I divide in Europe 'with the stronger countries forging ahead and the weaker countries further cutting their R&I support.' Kanerva and Hollanders (2009) Finland, Germany, and Austria) 'will emerge from this crisis with a relatively stronger innovative capacity ' (Filippeti and Archibugi, 2011: 189) . Makonnen (2013) reaches similar conclusions based on analysis of macro data for 2010. Data on R&D presented in Table 1 partly confirm their findings in the case of EU North-West and South EU, but contradict it in the case of Central-Eastern EU. We ascribe these differences largely to the limited period of the analysis, which covers only the period just before and soon after 2008 while our data extend into the recovery period. The effect of the limited time span is even greater in the study by Archibugi and Filippeti (2011) , who conclude that the 2008 crisis will impair convergence in RDI among the EU new member states. However, they ignore EU-South divergence and the compensatory or anti-cyclical effect of Structural Funds on RDI trends in new member states.
Methodology
Our analysis is based on the Erawatch-TrendChart Inventory2 (hereafter the Inventory) - The Inventory defines a policy measure as any instrument that:
 mobilizes resources (financial, human, organizational) through publicly (co-) financed R&I programmes or initiatives; and/or  funds the generation or diffusion of information and knowledge (studies, roadmaps, dissemination of technology activities, advisory services, public-private partnerships, etc.) to support R&I activities; and/or  promotes an institutional process (legal acts, regulatory rules) designed explicitly to influence the undertaking of R&I by organizations;  normally is implemented on an on-going (multi-annual) basis, rather than being a one-off event or a single project.
The key R&I policy measure groups include the following:
Research and innovation funding
The impact of the crisis on R&I policies has been analysed by the OECD, and as part of (2011) reports is related to preserving the stability of R&I funding in the aftermath of the crisis. Both the OECD and the European Commission argue that innovation is essential to boost productivity and sustainable growth, and have warned against damage to long-term growth and recommend accelerated structural shifts while bearing in mind that the role of innovation might differ in different country groups.
As a response to the crisis, all member states have implemented economic stimulus packages of various sizes and structures (European Parliament, 2009) . Although the primary objective has been to restore a functioning financial system and to stimulate aggregate demand in the short term, it is also understood that these packages can "contribute to a sustainable recovery only if the measures taken also strengthen the foundations of long-term sustainable growth" (see the presentation in Hutschenreiter, 2009). 6 So, have these packages managed to sustain investments in R&D across the EU?
In a nutshell, the answer is no, not across the board. Outcomes differ across the three EU sub-regions (see Table 1 ). 
Research and innovation policy measures
To analyse trends in the types of R&I policy measures we have distinguished among three country groups identified according to the severity of the crisis on their economies and according to the level of evolution of their R&I systems.
First, there has been a reduction in the number of R&I policy measures in the aftermath of the crisis (Table 1) to 51 and from 118 to 91 respectively and stayed roughly the same in the Central-Eastern EU group going from 90 to 92. However, there are differences within country groups, and there is no general pattern across countries. For instance, the reduction in the number of measures was greater in Spain than in Portugal, and while the number decreased in Hungary, it increased in Poland. Nevertheless, the Inventory shows three broad regional patterns: consolidation in the North-Western group, maintenance of the portfolio of Comparing the budgets devoted to certain policy areas in the three country groups, we find some shifts in emphasis. Figure 3 summarizes the results of the analysis, highlighting the types of policy measures that gained or lost importance between the two periods. Based on these data, and bearing in mind the limitations of Inventory data already referred to, we can make the following observations:  In the Southern country group funding for most policy priorities decreased except R&D cooperation and enterprise support for innovation (e.g. innovation in manufacturing, support for innovative start-ups and gazelles, recruitment of skilled people by enterprises). This decrease reflects a shift in emphasis towards business innovation, support for young entrepreneurs, and commercialization of research results. This crisis also prompted measures designed to help researchers and retain highly qualified personnel;  In the Central-Eastern EU group, the budget amounts allocated to on different priorities remained more or less the same across all groups of R&I support measures although with a slight shift towards enterprise support for innovation (e.g. innovation in manufacturing and support for start-ups and gazelles). However, the amount of the budget devoted to policy measures related to excellence, relevance and management of research in universities, and research infrastructures reduced.
The relative stability of R&I funding reflected in the Inventory data is due to the substantial role of Structural Funds which constitute a higher share of GBAORD than in the case of the Southern European countries (see Table 3 );  In the North-Western country group, the R&I budget increased between the period before the crisis to the last period of analysis. The priorities specifically enhanced were horizontal support measures for financing R&D, direct support for business R&D, support for innovation in manufacturing, support for service innovation and support for risk capital funds. These changes reflect increased support in financing and support for business innovation, which had started before 2008. It reflects longterm policy thinking rather than a response specifically to the crisis. Note that the budget devoted to R&D cooperation decreased in these countries, but this might be due to the cyclical nature of significant R&D programmes which cover specific periods, or to a shift in R&D cooperation towards European funding (FP7, Horizon2020). On the other hand, the budget for direct R&D subsidies has increased. The positive effects of R&D subsidies have been documented for Germany; Brautzsch et al. (2015, p. 623) show that they had a substantial leverage effect so that a subsidized R&D programme resulted in a production, value added and employment effect amounting to at least twice the initial financing. In other words, the R&D programme counteracted the 0.5% decline in GDP in 2009. Overall, the analysis shows that inter-regional patterns dominate: increased funding in North-West EU, decline in the financing in Southern EU and a substitution effect in Central and Eastern EU 10 (see Annex 1).
Conclusions
The crisis has had a severe impact on the real economy resulting in tighter credit supply, increased credit standards, and cuts to firm investments. It triggered a shift in many business strategies from long-term competitiveness to short-term survival. However, its impact differed among European countries. Innovation leaders, such as countries in Northern and Western Europe experienced no major shifts in R&D and innovation investments while the Southern-European countries entered a deep recession which has had a severe effect on their R&I systems. The consequences of the crisis on Central-Eastern European countries have been more ambiguous, with some countries benefiting from EU funds and using them as strong anti-cyclical devices, and others are experiencing deep depression and inability to use R&I funding as anti-cyclical devices.
The reduction in public funding has significantly impacted the R&I policy. On the positive side, many of the countries examined here regard R&I as a way out of the crisis and had made real progress in protecting public R&I activities. Although there was a countercyclical trend in 2008-2010 regarding government funding for R&I, maintaining funding levels became difficult after 2011. Securing financing for R&I policies is among the most relevant challenges.
One consequence of the changes in national public R&I funding is the increased importance of other sources. Pressure on public funding has led to more private-public partnerships to implement R&I programmes. Thus, the emphasis has shifted towards Structural Funds or other EU and international financing as more stable sources of finance.
The Structural Funds programmes have brought some stability for innovation systems since typically they provide on-going funds.
When we compare the country groups analysed, we observe that the crisis has induced three different responses from three EU regions. This finding contrasts with Makonnen (2013), Filippeti and Archibugi (2011) and Veugelers (2014) and is the result mainly of the longer time span and scope of analysis which includes both funding trends and actual policy changes. The crisis has worked to reconfigure the relevance of some R&I policy measures, although to different extents in the three country groups. The focus of R&I policies has been sustained in North West and Central and Eastern EU but have lost funding and priority in Southern Europe. In North-Western Europe, this has induced further support for R&I activities. In Southern Europe, it has led to the collapse of national public support and its substitution only to a small extent by EU Structural Funds. In the Central-Eastern country group, this compensation effect has been stronger. Policy mixes have not changed regarding their main composition, but they have been adjusted in North West EU and, to a lesser extent, in the other two EU groupings. This finding contradicts our initial hypothesis that policies do not change in countries less impacted by the crisis.
Overall, these trends suggest that R&I policies have operated as a factor of further divergence between EU North-West and EU-South, and as a potential factor of convergence between EU North-West and EU Central-East.
